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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This cross-appeal is a review of the trial court's decision denying Utah County's 
request to recover $10 for each day the gate installed by Butlers across the Bennie Creek 
Road remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). The trial court erred for the following reasons: (1) because the 
trial court incorrectly considered whether the gate was locked or unlocked, rather than 
consider the gate, itself as an "installation" in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-
104(4)(b); and (2) that even if the trial court properly considered whether the gate was 
locked or unlocked, the evidence at trial shows the gate was locked, or in the alternative 
demonstrates with reasonable precision how many days the gate was locked. 
In response Cross Appellees contend the following: (1) that Utah County failed to 
preserve the first issue, namely that the trial court incorrectly considered whether the gate 
was locked or unlocked, rather than consider the gate, as an "installation" in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b); and (2) that Utah County failed to marshal the 
evidence with respect to whether the evidence at trial shows the gate was locked or in the 
alternative demonstrates with reasonable precision how many days the gate was locked. 
Utah County preserved the issue of whether the trial court incorrectly considered 
whether the gate was locked or unlocked, rather than consider the gate as an "installation" 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). Preservation of the issue came by Utah 
County's discussion in the trial brief, the Notices served on the Butlers (Plaintiffs' 
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Exhibits 73 and 74), the testimony of at least 23 witnesses, the admissions of Mr. Butler, 
and the detailed discussion during closing argument. However, even if the issue was not 
preserved, the trial court ruled on grounds not raised at trial which are therefore 
automatically preserved for appeal. 
Utah County has also properly marshaled the evidence. Cross Appellees have 
failed to point to any evidence that Utah County allegedly failed to marshal. Glaringly 
absent from Cross Appellees' brief is any discussion of the evidence that Utah County did 
not marshal. Utah County has sufficiently marshaled the evidence and Cross Appellees 
have failed to address that evidence. Cross Appellees' failure to address the evidence, 
demonstrates that Cross Appellees have no legal basis to dispute that the trial court 
incorrectly determined against the weight of evidence that it could not determine with 
reasonable precision the number of days that the gate was locked in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). 
Therefore, the Appellate Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and 
Utah County should be granted judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate 
remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete from July 29, 1997 to August 
16, 2004 [the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 
2,754 days and $25,740.00. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH COUNTY PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT INCORRECTLY CONSIDERED WHETHER THE GATE WAS 
LOCKED OR UNLOCKED, RATHER THAN CONSIDER THE GATE AS 
AN "INSTALLATION" IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-
104(4)(B). 
"As a general rule [Appellate Courts] decline to address issues raised for the first 
time on appeal." Carrier v. Salt Lake City, 2004 UT 98, f!3, 104 P.3d 1208, 513 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23; See also Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8, ^[43, 20 P.3d 307. 
"An appellate court generally will not review any issue that was not raised in the court 
below." Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ^30, 16 P.3d 1233. "In sum, for an issue to be 
sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must be raised to a level of consciousness such 
that the trial judge can consider it." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); See also Lebaron & Assocs. v. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
In this case, Utah County argued in its trial brief that "the evidence at trial will 
demonstrate that Plaintiff Utah County served written notices on Defendants Randy 
Butler and Donna Butler on July 29, 1997 to remove any and all poles, structures or 
objects of any kind or character placed, constructed or maintained by them within the 
right-of-way of the Bennie Creek Road, including, but not limited to, any gates placed 
thereon. As a result, Plaintiff Utah County is entitled to judgment, joint and several, 
against Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler at the rate of $10 per day, plus 
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interest from July 29, 1997 to the present, costs and expenses incurred for removing the 
gate, and costs of this lawsuit." (R. at 001432). 
At trial, Utah County introduced into evidence Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. 73 and 74 
which were Notices dated July 18, 1997, and signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of 
the Utah County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Notices"). Those Notices were served on the Butlers on July 29, 1997 and informed 
them that their gate was illegal and must be removed from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147 
and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74.) Those Notices further informed them that if they 
failed to remove the gate within ten (10) days of service of the Notices, then Utah County 
may recover the sum of $10 for each day it remains within the right-of-way. See Id. 
Also, at least 23 witnesses testified at trial that a gate was installed on the Road, 
which was often frequently locked. (R. at 001639:19-20, 31, 58, 135, 150-151, 161-162, 
165, 167; 001640:203, 208-210, 218, 221, 224, 227, 237, 240, 247-248, 252, 254-255, 
261, 266, 279-280, 323, 327, 379, 386-389, 401-402, 418, 421-422, 424; 001641:446-
447? 462-464, 467, 478, 485, 532, 537-538, 566; 001642:691). 
Randy Butler admits that prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers erected a gate across 
the Road. (R. at 001645:1074-1075). Mr. Butler also admits that he and his wife, Donna 
Butler were served on July 29, 1997 with Notices dated July 18, 1997 and signed by 
David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah County Board of Commissioners, directing them 
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to remove the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147 and Plaintiffs Exhibits Nos. 73 
and 74). Finally, the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 was discussed in detail 
during closing argument. (R. at 001646:1192, 1195, 1214-1220). 
Utah County preserved the issue discussed in Section I herein for appeal based on 
its discussion in the trial brief, the Notices, the testimony of at least 23 witnesses, the 
admissions of Mr. Butler, and the detailed discussion during closing argument. 
Therefore, the Appellate Court should consider whether the trial court incorrectly 
considered whether the gate was locked or unlocked, rather than consider the gate as an 
"installation" in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(B). Furthermore, the 
Appellate Court after considering that issue should reverse the decision of the trial court 
and Utah County should be granted judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate 
remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete from July 29, 1997 to August 
16, 2004 [the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 
2,754 days and $25,740.00. 
II. IF UTAH COUNTY FAILED PRESERVE THE ISSUE DISCUSSED IN 
SECTION I, THEN THE TRIAL COURT RULED ON GROUNDS NOT 
RAISED AT TRIAL WHICH ARE THEREFORE PRESERVED FOR 
APPEAL. 
In addition to any issue raised at the trial court level, all issues not raised at the 
trial court level but ruled on by the trial judge are preserved for appeal. See generally 
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State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991); See also Estate of Covington By 
and Through Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 1994). 
In this case, the trial court ruled in its Memorandum Decision as follows: 
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. 
Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many people were unable to 
travel the road after that time without gaining permission or using a key provided 
by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one exhibit shows a gate [sic] created by the 
County which allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers 
to close the gate and stay on the road until arriving at the forest service. As noted 
above, there have historically been gates across the road for purposes unrelated to 
obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern and would 
not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared today. 
(R. 001459). Since the trial court ruled that an unlocked gate would not be considered to 
violate the right-of-way, it improperly ruled that an unlocked gate is not an installation 
that would violate Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. If Utah County failed to properly 
preserve this issue, then the trial court ruled on grounds not raised at trial by either party. 
As a result, that issue is automatically preserved for appeal. 
Therefore, the Appellate Court should consider whether the trial court incorrectly 
considered whether the gate was locked or unlocked, rather than consider the gate as an 
"installation" in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(B). Furthermore, the 
Appellate Court after considering that issue should reverse the decision of the trial court 
and Utah County should be granted judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate 
remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete from July 29, 1997 to August 
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16, 2004 [the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 
2,754 days and $25,740.00. 
III. UTAH COUNTY HAS PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND 
CROSS APPELLEES FAILED TO SHOW ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
WOULD INDICATE THAT UTAH COUNTY FAILED TO PROPERLY 
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE. 
At the outset, Utah County acknowledged and embraced its cross appeal burden of 
marshaling all of the evidence both for and against the trial court's decision on the 
$10/day damages issue. With that in mind, Utah County marshaled every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings that it resists. See 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); See 
also Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, \1\ 987 P.2d 588. Cross-Appellees argues that 
Utah County has failed to marshal the evidence. {See Reply Brief of Appellants/Brief of 
Cross-Appellees, page 17). 
The Appellate Court has previously recognized that "[pjrudent appellees likely 
will not rely solely on an assertion that the appellant has failed to marshal the evidence; 
rather, appellees are compelled to perform the marshaling process to protect their 
position." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 
1053 (Utah App. 1994). In this case, Cross-Appellees merely assert that Utah County has 
failed to marshal and do not themselves perform the marshaling process nor do they point 
to any evidence that they allege Utah County has failed to marshal. There is no evidence 
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in the trial record that Utah County failed to marshal. Thus, the reason why Cross-
Appellees failed to cite any evidence in their brief. 
Therefore, the Appellate Court should find that Utah County properly marshaled 
the evidence. After considering that evidence, the Appellate Court should reverse the 
decision of the trial court and Utah County should be granted judgment in the amount of 
$10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete 
from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004 [the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order] for a total of 2,754 days and $25,740.00. 
IV. ASSUMING THAT UTAH COUNTY PROPERLY MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE, CROSS APPELLEES FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED 
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE THAT IT COULD NOT 
DETERMINE WITH REASONABLE PRECISION THE NUMBER OF 
DAYS THAT THE GATE WAS LOCKED IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 72-7-104(4)(B). 
Assuming that Utah County properly marshaled the evidence and that the issue is 
relevant and properly before the Appellate Court, Cross-Appellees failed to address 
Section VIII of Utah County's initial brief. Section VIII of Utah County's initial brief 
addressed whether the trial court incorrectly determined against the weight of evidence 
that it could not determine with reasonable precision the number of days that the gate was 
locked in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(B). 
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"If an appellee fails to respond to an issue in its brief, the court may treat the 
failure to respond as a confession that the appellant's positions is correct... or determine 
that the issue has merit." 5 Am Jur. 2d. Appellate Review, §555; See also Nance v. Miami 
Sand & Gravel LLC, 825 N.E.2d 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("appellee's failure to 
respond to an issue raised in an appellant's brief is, as to that issue, akin to failing to file a 
brief.") The failure to respond to the merits of a controversy can be considered a 
confession of reversible error. See Bulova Watch Co. v. Super City Dept. Stores of Ariz., 
Inc., 4 Ariz.App. 553, 422 P.2d 184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). 
In Utah County's initial brief, Utah County discussed all of the evidence produced 
at trial, both for and against, which showed the number of days the gate was locked in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). To reiterate, the evidence produced at 
trial was that prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers erected a gate across the Road. (R. At 
001645:1074-1075). On July 29, 1997 the Butlers were served with Notices dated July 
18, 1997 and signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah County Board of 
Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Road. (R. At 001645:1147 
and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74.) 
After the aforementioned Notices were served on the Butlers, they did not remove 
the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147). On June 14, 2004 during trial, Randy 
Butler was asked "After you received that letter [Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at 
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001645:1147). Randy Butler responded " N o . . . . " (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was 
then asked "Is the gate still closed today and locked?" (R. at 001645:1147). Randy 
responded "Yeah." (R. at 001645:1II7). 
\ t least 23 witnesses testified tl lat Bi itler's gate was installed on tl i s I I oa< :! ai id 
prevented access unless they obtained permission from the Butlers (R. at 001639:19-20, 
31, 58, 135, 150-lf 1, 161 162, 165, 167; 001640:203, 208-210, 218, 221, 224, 227, 237, 
24u, J.'*" M8, 252, 254-255, 261, 266, 279-280, 323, 327, 379, 386-389, K -1 102 H8 
421-422, 424; 001641:446-447, 462-464, 467, 478, 485, 532, 537-538, 566; 001642:691). 
During closing argument, the trial court commented that "Your client was served 
)i rl I le 29th of Ji \\] •
 : 199 7 1 1 le r • : •.. • •• st 
totaling it up it's something like 2,300 days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I mean 
that's - and that's not counting the present year." (R. at 001646:1214). Later during 
closing argument, tl le trial coi n t stated that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on 
the gate was locked. I know from having supervised this case for a little while that there 
was a period of time by consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked 
again testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to 
the evidence that I heard at trial." (R. at 001646:1219). 
Furthermore, there was additional evidence in the record, such as a letter from 
Randy Butler to former Utah County Commissioner Gary L. Herbert, dated December 9, 
10 
2002, in which Mr. Butler set forth with reasonable precision the amount of days that he 
left the gate unlocked. (R. at 001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4). In that letter, Mr. Butler 
states that "in October of 2001, we agreed to allow access for the hunts. That fall Utah 
County put up a sign on the gate that stated it was private property to the U.S. Forest 
Service Land. We left the gate unlocked for approximately 30 days. . . . We locked the 
gate again until August 20, 2002 without incident. . . . Consequently, I locked the gate on 
October 24, 2002, and as of December 1, 2002, there has not been any problem." (R. at 
001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4). 
The only evidence to the contrary offered by Cross-Appellees was the "Notice of 
Public Hearing" and a sign placed on the gate across the Road by Utah County. For a 
more detailed discussion of these two items, please see Section IX of Utah County's 
initial brief. Cross-Appellees point to no other evidence to the contrary because there is 
none. The trial court even so commented when it said "the only testimony I have is that 
from '96 on the gate was locked. I know from having supervised this case for a little 
while that there was a period of time by consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it 
was locked again. I don't know. But none of that testimony was presented at trial, so 
let's stick to the evidence that I heard at trial." (R. at 001646:1219). 
Therefore, after considering that evidence, the Appellate Court should reverse the 
decision of the trial court and Utah County should be granted judgment in the amount of 
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$10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete 
from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004 [the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order] for a total of 2,754 days and $25,7 10 00 or in the alternative subtract 94 
days for the t - he gate was • - • v.:<^cr 2001, ai id from A \ igi ist 20, 2002 to 
October 24, 2002 and adjust the Judgment accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Based oi I 1 Ital i Coi n ity 's ii litial bi k i ai id tl IC forgoing, • . - ••- respectfully 
requests: 
1 That the Court uphold the decision of the trial court which determined that the 
Bennie Creek f^^.> ^ ; hfare and dismiss Appellants' appeal. 
2. fhat the Court reverse the trial court and order judgment in favor of Utah 
County and against Defendants Butler for a penalty of $10.00 for each day that the gate 
remainec ie Bennie Creek Road right of way after service of the Notice to remove the 
same, or in the alternative, for $10.00 for each day the gate remaiiled locked across the 
Bennie Creek Road after service of the Notice to remove the same. 
3. Plaintiffs costs on appeal and cross appeal. 
4. For such further relief as is just and equitable in the premises. 
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